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ABSTRACT 
There is recent interest in using Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) to derive health state 
utility values and results can differ from Time Trade Off (TTO). Clearly DCE is 'choice-based' 
whereas TTO is generally considered to be a 'matching' task. We explore whether procedural 
adaptations to the TTO -which make the method more closely resemble a DCE -makes TTO 
and choice converge. In particular, we test whether making the matching procedure in TTO less 
'transparent' to the respondent reduces disparities between TTO and DCE. We designed an 
interactive survey that was hosted on the internet and 2022 interviews were achieved in the UK 
in a representative sample of the population. We found a marked divergence between TTO and 
DCE, but this was not related to the 'transparency' of the TTO procedure. We conclude that a 
difference in the error structure between TTO and choice and that factors other than differences 
in utility are affecting choices is driving the divergence.  The latter has fundamental 
implications for the way choice data are analysed and interpreted.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been recent interest in the use of discrete choice experiments (DCE) to derive health 
state utilities for use in QALY calculations1-5.  When compared head to head, DCE and TTO 
have been shown to arrive at different utility estimates3,6 but to date little research has gone into 
exploring the factors that might be driving differences. Arguments have been put forward 
previously regarding the relative merits of DCE compared with ‘traditional’ methods such as 
TTO and SG.  For example, it has been argued that traditional value elicitation techniques, such 
as TTO and SG, that set out to establish an individual’s point of indifference are more 
cognitively demanding than those involving pair-wise choices4,5. For example, in discussing 
the TTO, Bansback and colleagues1 consider  “there is still a concern that the tasks involved 
are still too cognitively demanding for certain populations, resulting in response inconsistencies 
and subsequent data exclusions, which limit the representativeness of the values obtained” (p. 
306). 
 
There are, of course, a number of features of an actual DCE that may explain differences in 
valuations across methods, such as the functional form of the model deployed in modelling the 
choice data.  We are interested here, however, in the choices themselves and not how the choice 
data are subsequently modelled.  There are many reasons why a DCE that sets out to value 
health state utilities using time as the numeraire –sometimes referred to as DCETTO - may yield 
systematically different valuations from traditional TTO.  
 
It has been observed for some time that preferences over two options can change depending on 
the elicitation procedure used. In particular, it is well known that ‘matching’ and ‘choice’ tasks 
yield different results7 and this has been studied previously in relation to health state utility 
measurement8-10.  In one study using TTO, Attema and colleagues found significantly different 
valuations between matching and choice along with the presence of preference reversals10. 
Matching may encourage more quantitative decision making processes and give more weight 
to the attribute used as the ‘currency’ on which to match, whilst choice may encourage more 
qualitative decision making and give more weight to the most ‘prominent’ attribute7,11.  Whilst, 
on the face of it, this may appear to offer an explanation of any differences between DCE and 
more traditional utility elicitation methods, in reality TTO (and SG) are generally 
operationalised as a series of pair-wise choices that set out to ‘home in’ on a point of 
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indifference, a technique which has been referred to as ‘choice-based matching’12.  Fischer and 
colleagues developed the task-goal hypothesis and argued that more weight is given to the 
prominent attribute when the aim is to differentiate between options (as in choice), than in tasks 
where the aim is to equate options (as in matching). They showed that when the objective – or 
goal – of the matching task was made less transparent using a ‘hidden choice-based matching’ 
technique, preference reversals between matching and choice were reduced12.   
 
Applying this to the context here, it will generally be obvious to respondents that a TTO is 
iterating towards a point of indifference and they are being asked via this process to ‘match’ a 
number of years in normal health to X years in the target health state. This aim could, however, 
be made less transparent to respondents and the findings of Fischer lead us to hypothesise this 
will reduce differences between TTO and direct choice. This essentially involves using an 
iterative procedure to arrive at the point of indifference in TTO, but moves away from valuing 
states sequentially where one state is valued before moving on to the next. In contrast, states 
could be valued concurrently, whereby the respondent sees different states in alternating 
questions (this will be explained in detail below). Arguably, the task in TTO would be even less 
transparent if non-iterative procedures were used to arrive at the point(s) of indifference.  
Valuing health states concurrently in TTO using a non-iterative procedure is more in line with 
how states would be valued within a DCE.    
 
The issue of interest here is whether we can predict choices between health profiles based on 
respondent’s TTO valuations. Such a prediction clearly requires the imposition of restrictions 
on the utility function for health.  We could assume, for example, that the linear QALY model 
holds and simply estimate the total number of QALYs in each alternative and predict that the 
respondent will choose the alternative offering the higher number. Linearity is, however, a very 
restrictive assumption, so we rely here on the weaker conditions of mutual utility independence 
(MUI) and constant proportional trade-off (CPTO) which allow subjects to discount future 
health. More details about these assumptions are given in Appendix 1. We then test whether 
choices can be predicted from TTO responses when the TTO procedure varies according to how 
‘transparent’ the TTO task is in relation to; a) whether an iterative or non-iterative procedure is 
used to arrive at a point of indifference and b) whether health states are valued ‘sequentially’ or 
‘concurrently’. 
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If varying these factors can offer an explanation of differences between TTO and direct choice, 
then we would expect doing so to; a) systematically influence the TTO valuations themselves 
and b) bring about convergence between TTO and direct choice.  
 
The objectives of the current study are therefore to: 
1. Examine whether TTO responses are robust to the procedural variations listed above. 
2. Examine to what extent direct choices may be predicted from TTO responses. 
  
METHODS 
Survey design 
In order to explore all factors of interest, but without over burdening respondents, 8 different 
versions of the survey were designed and hosted on the internet. Sections 1-3 of the survey were 
identical for all versions and are described in Appendix 2. In section 4, respondents were 
randomised to one of 8 versions of the survey according to which variant of TTO – and set of 
health states- they would see.   
 
Before going on to explain the TTO variants in detail, we first describe the health states used in 
the survey. The health states were based on the EQ-5D 5L descriptive system.  Two sets of health 
states were constructed- ‘Odd’ and ‘Even’ -which were used in the odd and even numbered 
groups respectively.  The health states are set out in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: EQ 5D (5L) health states used in the TTO exercises 
Odd Even 
11121 13122 
21211 13224 
12212 23242 
13122 23314 
 
The health states were chosen to cover different severities whilst minimising the likelihood that 
any state would be rated as worse than dead by a large number of respondents (we explain this 
further in explaining the ‘direct choice’ questions). It is easy to see, however, that the Even set 
is generally more severe than the Odd set. One state – 13122- was common to both groups, 
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which offers a test of the impact of ‘context’ on valuation. Each set also included one state that 
strictly dominated at least one other.  Thus, 11121 dominates 13122 in the Odd set and 13122 
dominates 13224 and 23242 in the Even set.  The inclusion of strict dominance offers a 
straightforward test of consistency of responses.   
 
Iterative TTO procedures 
The TTO variants may be separated broadly into ‘iterative’ and ‘non-iterative’ procedures. We 
begin by describing the ‘iterative’ variants in detail.   
 
Iterative, states valued sequentially’ (i.e. traditional TTO) 
This variant replicates a ‘traditional’ TTO exercise although duration is not presented 
graphically as some researchers have done previously.  Respondents are first presented with a 
choice between 20 years in Life A and 10 years in Life B. The scenario as presented to 
respondents is depicted in Figure 2 using state 21211 as an example. If the respondent preferred 
10 years in Life B to 20 years in Life A, they were then presented with a choice between 8 years 
in Life B and 20 years in Life A. If the respondent preferred 20 years in Life A to 10 years in 
Life B, they were then presented with a choice between 20 years in Life A and 12 years in Life 
B.  This iterative process continued until they ‘switched’ to preferring Life A to Life B in 
successive two year intervals –or vice versa-they were then asked about the year in between.  
For example, if they ‘switched’ from preferring Life A to Life B between 14 years and 16 years 
in Life B, they were then asked about 15 years in Life B. The utility value was then taken as 
the midpoint of the years between which they ‘switched’.  So, if they preferred Life B at 16 
years, but Life A at 15 years, the utility value was taken to be 15.5/20 = 0.775.  Thus, the utilities 
were measured to the nearest 0.025. If they still preferred Life A when the number of years in 
Life B was 19, they were asked about 19 years and 6 months- and then about 19 years and 9 
months if they continued to prefer Life A.  This was done in order to introduce greater 
sensitivity towards the top end of the utility space. Those respondents who would not trade even 
3 months of life expectancy to avoid the health state in question were considered to be ‘non-
traders’ and a value of ‘1’ was attached to that health state.  
 
At the other end of the scale, if they still preferred one year in Life B to 20 years in Life A, they 
were asked whether they would prefer immediate death to 20 years in Life A.  No worse than 
dead valuations were sought- if respondents said ‘yes’ to the ‘immediate death’ question, their 
valuation of that health state was taken to be zero.  
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Figure 2: The basic TTO scenario used (using 21211 as an example). 
Please choose between the Life A and Life B shown below. Read the descriptions and numbers 
of lives carefully before you make a choice: 
 
LIFE A  LIFE B  
20 YEARS WITH  10 YEARS WITH 
Slight problems in walking about   NO problems in walking about  
NO problems washing or dressing 
oneself 
  NO problems washing or dressing 
oneself 
 
Slight problems doing usual 
activities 
  NO problems doing usual 
activities 
 
No pain or discomfort   NO pain or discomfort  
NOT anxious or depressed   NOT anxious or depressed  
FOLLOWED BY DEATH  FOLLOWED BY DEATH 
 
Which would you prefer? 
 
o Life A  o Life B 
Click NEXT to continue 
 
In this iterative sequential variant the iterative procedure is followed through to the end for each 
health state before moving onto the next. Hence, states are valued ‘sequentially’ as is traditional 
in health state valuation exercises such as TTO and SG.  The way in which this differs across 
the remaining iterative versions is explained below. The health states were valued in the order: 
12212, 11121, 13122, 21211 in the Odd group and 23242, 13122, 23314, 13224 in the Even 
group. 
 
Iterative, states valued concurrently 
This is the variant that is most akin to ‘hidden choice-based matching’ discussed above. The 
main feature of this variant is that, rather than working through the iterative procedure for one 
health state before moving onto the next, the iterative procedures were effectively ‘spliced’ 
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together and the valuations undertaken concurrently. Hence, even within an iterative procedure, 
it is arguably less ‘transparent’ to respondents what their task is for each state. For example, in 
the odd version respondents were first asked to consider 10 years in 12212- denoted as Life A 
-and 20 years in normal health-denoted as  Life B.  Irrespective of their response, they would 
next be asked to choose between a different Life A- this time 10 years in 21211 -and 20 years 
in Life B and so on until all 4 health states had appeared in Life A.  After this first ‘round’ of 4 
choices had been completed, the next 4 questions were each the next step in an iterative 
procedure underway for each health state. Each iterative procedure was identical to that 
described above for the traditional TTO and continued until all 4 states had been valued. The 
order in which the states appeared in each round was the same as they were valued in the 
traditional TTO.  
 
Non-iterative versions  
The other broad category of TTO variants deployed in the survey is ‘non -iterative’ approaches. 
As the name suggests, the main feature of non-iterative TTOs was that they do not set out to 
‘home in’ on a point of indifference. Rather, respondents are presented with choices that are 
not based on their previous responses. The use of a non-iterative TTO procedure is arguably 
again making it less transparent to respondents that their task is to equate options. As with the 
iterative approaches, the non-iterative versions may be further classified according to whether 
health states are valued ‘sequentially’ or ‘concurrently’. 
 
Non-iterative, states valued sequentially 
Respondents randomised to the ‘non-iterative-sequential’ variants were first asked to choose 
between Life A-20 years in the first health state under evaluation and Life B-either 4, 8, 12 or 
16 years in normal health with that number being allocated randomly. Irrespective of their 
response to the first question, the number of years in Life B was changed to one of the 3 
remaining durations- again drawn randomly. And so on until all 4 durations had appeared in 
Life B. The responses to the initial 4 questions allowed the ‘range’ within which that 
respondent’s utility value lies to be estimated. The number of years in normal health in Life B 
was then set at the midpoint of that range. For example, consider the following sequence of 
responses to the first 4 questions (where the number of years in Life B relate to years in normal 
health).  
1. 8, Life B vs 20, Life A- Prefer Life A, 
2. 16, Life B vs 20, Life A- Prefer Life B, 
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3. 12, Life B vs 20, Life A-Prefer Life B, 
4. 4, Life B vs 20, Life A- Prefer Life A.   
 
As the respondent ‘switches’ from preferring Life A to preferring Life B between 8 and 12 
years, they are next asked about 10 years (in normal health) in Life B. Depending on their 
response to that question, they would then be asked about 11 or 13 years (in normal health) in 
Life B.  Thus, it is obvious that it is only the first part of the procedure that is truly non–iterative 
(n.b. a wholly non-iterative system that assessed utility values to the same degree of accuracy 
as in the traditional TTO, would entail presenting respondents with 20 choices for each health 
state). Utility values were derived in exactly the same way and recorded to the same degree of 
accuracy as in the traditional TTO.   As in the traditional TTO, the valuation procedure is 
followed all the way through for each health state before moving onto the next. The order in 
which the states were valued in this version was the same as in the traditional TTO.  Unlike 
with iterative procedures, respondents in the non-iterative versions can give inconsistent 
responses in a TTO for any particular health state and then no utility value may be estimated, 
raising the possibility of missing data.  
 
 Non-iterative, states valued concurrently. 
In this variant both the number of years in Life B and the health state that appeared in Life A 
were allocated randomly. Thus, the first 16 questions respondents were a random draw from all 
possible combinations of durations and health states. It could be argued that it is this variant 
that makes the task of the TTO the least transparent and best replicates the pattern of choices 
that respondents would face in a DCE.  Responses to these 16 questions allowed the ‘range’ 
within which that respondent’s utility value for each of the 4 health states lies. The procedure 
thereafter was exactly as in the ‘sequential’ version described above and ended after all 4 health 
states had been valued.  
 
Table 1 shows the 8 TTO variants and identifies which variants may be considered to be the 
least transparent and the most transparent.   
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Table 1: Summary of the TTO variants 1-8 
 States valued  
Sequentially 
States valued  
Concurrently 
 ODD EVEN ODD EVEN 
 
Iterative 
Group 1 
* 
Group 2 
* 
Group 3 
 
Group 4 
 
Non-
iterative 
Group 5 
 
Group 6 
 
Group 7 
** 
Group 8 
** 
*The most ‘transparent’ TTO method (traditional TTO)  
**The least ‘transparent’ TTO method  
 
The direct choice questions 
All respondents then answered 6 ‘direct choice’ questions in which pairs of EQ-5D health states 
were compared directly to one another and the choice was between X years in one health state 
and Y years in the other.  This is in contrast to the TTO whereby – irrespective of variant- the 
actual choice made is always between X years in normal health and 20 years in the ‘target’ 
health state.  The relative valuation of two different ‘target’ health states is then inferred 
indirectly from the TTO responses.  In estimating QALY gains for use in economic evaluation, 
however, we are generally concerned with ‘moves’ between one EQ 5D health state and 
another-so it could be argued that it is the ‘direct’ valuation that is the more legimate.   
 
The basic idea behind the direct choice questions was to take an individual’s TTO responses to 
two different EQ 5D health states and to present them with a choice between X years in one 
health state and Y years in the other. The values of X and Y were set such that the respondent 
ought to be indifferent between the two alternatives.  More details of the approach are given in 
Appendix 2. 
 
Suppose that U1 and U2 are the TTO utility values for health states 1 and 2 respectively.  The 
programme would first select the state with the lower utility value. Suppose that U1<U2.  The 
direct choice would present respondents with X years in health state 1 and U1/U2 * X years in 
health state 2.  In each choice, one of the two states always appeared in Life A- whilst the other 
appeared in Life B- and this was set in advance.  Thus, either Life A or Life B could involve 
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the greater number of life years- depending on the respondent’s valuation of the health states in 
the TTO.  Suppose the health state that appeared in Life A had been valued more highly in the 
TTO than the other in the pair. Three different values of X were then used in Life B: 17, 18 and 
19 years- which were assigned at random. So, for example, if U1 and U2 equalled 0.6 and 0.8 
respectively, and 18 years was selected as the value of X, Y would then be set at 0.6/0.8 * 18 = 
13.5 years.  The respondent would then be presented with a choice between Life A: 13.5 years 
in health state 1 and Life B: 18 years in health state 2.  Alternatively, a respondent with U1 and 
U2 of 0.8 and 0.6 respectively, would be faced with a choice between Life A: 18 years in health 
state 1 and Life B: 13.5 years in health state 2. In the case where U1=U2, then X and Y would 
take on the same value (either 17, 18 or 19 years) and, as above, in each pair the same health 
state would always appear under Life A and the other in Life B.  The assumption is always that 
the choice has been set up such that the respondent ought to be indifferent between Lives A and 
B. 
  
No direct choice question was generated whenever a respondent rated one of the health states 
as worse than dead or were inconsistent in the valuation of either health state such that a utility 
value could not be estimated (this could only happen in the non-iterative versions).  We return 
to this issue in the results section.   
 
ANALYSIS 
 
We first tested whether TTO responses are robust to the procedural variations explored here.  
We tested procedural variations using a linear regression that allowed for the clustering of 
observations by respondent.  The dependent variable was the TTO value. Dummies were 
included for the health states (6 dummies, with the base level being the common health state 
13122), and TTO method (i.e. iterative concurrent, non-iterative sequential, non-iterative 
concurrent).  The dummy variables were set up so that the constant term represented the TTO 
value for health state 13122 under the traditional TTO method (i.e. iterative sequential) and 
interaction terms were included to explore the impact of the variants on the remaining health 
states. We used a chi-squared test to determine whether the variant dummies and their 
interactions were simultaneously zero. This is similar to testing for significant differences 
between a model with these variant variables added and a model without them, i.e. the 
difference between full model and reduced models.  In another version of this model, we also 
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included a dummy for the Even - as opposed to Odd- group, to provide a means of testing 
whether the TTO value of the common state (13122) was subject to ‘context’ effects.     
 
We next tested whether direct choices may be predicted from TTO responses. If responses to 
TTO and choice coincide we expect the ‘splits’ in the choices to be 50:50 on average and, 
hence the probability of choosing Life A or Life B to be 0.5. In each case, we test this by a 
one- sample binomial test of whether the probability of choosing Life A was significantly 
different than 0.5. We then pool the data across direct choice questions and test whether the 
pattern of choices of respondents in the other TTO variants are significantly different than 
those in the traditional TTO using a Generalised Estimating Equation (GEE) model that 
allows for clustering of observations on individuals.  
 
 
RESULTS 
Data were collected in June 2014 and 2022 completed interviews were achieved. The sample 
comprised of 947 (46.8%) males and 1075 (53.2%) females.  Mean (median) age was 44.6 (45) 
with a range of 18-70.   The age/gender breakdown is shown in Appendix 3 and compared to a 
representative UK population.  
 
The mean (median) utility values derived for the health states in TTO variants 1-8 are presented 
in Table 2.  In all variants, the general pattern of responses across health states is roughly as 
expected in that milder states are generally valued more highly than the more severe.  There is 
no immediately obvious pattern, however, across variants of the TTO, but we look at the 
responses in more detail below.  
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Table 2: Mean (median) utility values from TTO exercises by group* 
TTO method Group 11121 21211 12212 
  
13122   
  
13224 23242  23314   
  
 
Iterative: 
sequential 
(traditional 
TTO) 
Group 1 
 
.813 
(.925) 
.787 
(.925) 
.652 
(.775) 
.667 
(.775) 
   
Group 2 
 
   .669 
(.825) 
.477 
(.475) 
.421 
(.425) 
.466 
(.475) 
 
Iterative: 
concurrent 
Group 3 
 
.803 
(.925) 
.763 
(.875) 
.662 
(.775) 
.627 
(.725) 
   
Group 4 
 
   .632 
(.775) 
.392 
(.375) 
.311 
(.175) 
.375 
(.350) 
 
Non- iterative: 
sequential 
Group 5 
 
.855 
(.957) 
.808 
(.925) 
.714 
(.825) 
.658 
(.775) 
   
Group 6 
 
   .713 
(.825) 
.439 
(.425) 
.363 
(.275) 
.426 
(.375) 
 
Non-iterative: 
concurrent 
Group 7 
 
.840 
(.925) 
.791 
(.925) 
.737 
(.875) 
.657 
(.775) 
   
Group 8    .663 
(.800) 
.407 
(.375) 
.356 
(.300) 
.423 
(.375) 
 
We first tested whether TTO responses are robust to the procedural variations explored here.  
The full linear regression results are presented in Appendix 4 and summarised here.  Recall 
that the chi tests here are testing for significant differences between models with and without 
these variables added i.e. between a full and reduced model.  We find that the chi squared 
tests of differences for a model including the variants and their interactions were statistically 
significant (e.g. non-iterative sequential chi2( 21) = 39.07  Prob > chi2 =    0.0096 ).   
The results also showed that the value of 13122 (the common health state which everyone 
valued, and which is the intercept term in the regression) was not significantly different 
between the odd and even groups, indicating that TTO valuations are robust to ‘context’ 
effects (i.e. the coefficient on the Even dummy was not statistically different in the model 
presented in Appendix 4). As a sensitivity analysis, we reran the regression excluding 
responses that violate dominance and found similar results. 
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We also tested whether direct choices may be predicted from TTO responses assuming MUI 
and CPTO by exploring how well the aggregate choices coincide with TTO responses. Recall 
that if TTO and choice coincide we expect the ‘splits’ in the choices to be 50:50 on average 
and, hence the probability of choosing Life A or Life B to be 0.5. As above, no direct choice 
would be generated when the respondent valued a state as bad as dead or gave inconsistent 
responses within a non-iterative procedure such that no utility value may be estimated. This 
resulted in a fairly large number of respondents omitted from the choices particularly for those 
involving the more severe states and using a non-iterative procedure but we still had groups of 
at least 100 subjects. Tables 3 and 4 show the pairs of health states involved in the direct choices 
and number of respondents who answered each question for the odd and even versions 
respectively.  Recall that one health state in the pair always appeared in Life A or Life B each 
time- in Tables 3 and 4 the health state that appeared in Life A is always the first in the pair.  In 
each case, the direct choice was set up such that it was predicted (from their TTO responses) 
that the respondent would be indifferent between Life A and Life B- and, hence, we would 
expect a 50:50 on aggregate. We report first the overall splits of a preference for Life A (always 
involving the first health state in the pair) and Life B (always involving the second health state 
in the pair) in Tables 3 and 4 for the odd and even groups respectively.  
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Table 3: The main ‘splits’ of preferences for Lives A and B the direct choices in the odd groups 
(prediction was 50:50) 
  Pairs of health states involved in the direct choices 
TTO variant Group 11121 
vs 
21211 
11121 
vs 
12212 
11121 
vs 
13122 
21211 
vs 
12212 
21211 
vs 
13122 
12212 
vs 
13122 
Iterative: 
sequential 
(traditional 
TTO) 
Group 1 69:31 
(N=172) 
 
.000* 
53:47 
(N=168) 
 
.396 
75:25 
(N=165) 
 
.000* 
52:48 
(N=166) 
 
.103 
72:28 
(N=165) 
 
.000* 
79:21 
(N=163) 
 
.000* 
Iterative: 
concurrent 
Group 3 63:37 
(N=179) 
 
.001* 
64:36 
(N=177) 
 
.000* 
72:28 
(N=170) 
 
.000* 
62:38 
(N=175) 
 
.290 
73:27 
(N=169) 
 
.000* 
80:20 
(N=168) 
 
.000* 
Non-iterative: 
sequential 
 
Group 5 63:37 
(N=140) 
 
.003* 
55:45 
(N=146) 
 
.282 
69:31 
(N=134) 
 
.000* 
52:48 
(N=143) 
 
.0198 
68:32 
(N=151) 
 
.000* 
79:21 
(N=133) 
 
.000* 
Non-iterative: 
concurrent 
Group 7 69:31 
(N=143) 
 
.000* 
62:38 
(N=138) 
 
.005* 
77:23 
(N=138) 
 
.000* 
54:46 
(N=138) 
 
.162 
72:28 
(N=148) 
 
.000* 
76:24 
(N=145) 
 
.000* 
*One sample binomial test shows sig difference from p=0.5 (50:50 split) at 0.05 level of 
significance 
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Table 4: The main ‘splits’ of preferences for Lives A and B the direct choices in the even groups 
(prediction was 50:50) 
  Pairs of health states involved in the direct choices 
TTO variant Group 13122 
vs 
13224 
13122 
vs 
23242 
13122 
vs 
23314 
13224 
vs  
23242 
13224 
vs  
23314 
23242  
vs 
 23314 
Iterative: 
sequential 
(traditional 
TTO) 
Group 2 64:36 
(N=152) 
 
.001* 
68:32 
(N=158) 
 
.000* 
67:31 
(N=152) 
 
.000* 
61:39 
(N=145) 
 
.319 
52:48 
(N=151) 
 
.625 
43:57 
(N=145) 
 
.135 
Iterative: 
concurrent 
Group 4 65:35 
(N=141) 
 
.001* 
64:36 
(N=132) 
 
.001* 
64:36 
(N=135) 
 
.001* 
57:43 
(N=123) 
 
.471 
73:27 
(N=130) 
 
.000* 
55:45 
(N=118) 
 
.311 
Non-iterative: 
sequential 
Group 6 63:37 
(N=120) 
 
.005* 
61:39 
(N=126) 
 
.016* 
64:36 
(N=118) 
 
.002* 
50:50 
(N=121) 
 
.585 
45:55 
(N=131) 
 
.294 
53:47 
(N=112) 
 
.637 
Non-iterative: 
concurrent 
Group 8 57:43 
(N=106) 
 
.025* 
59:41 
(N=104) 
 
.062 
65:35 
(N=107) 
 
.000* 
56:44 
(N=107) 
 
.082 
42:58 
(N=112) 
 
.299 
40:60 
(N=101) 
 
.111 
*One sample binomial test shows sig difference from p=0.5 (50:50 split) at 0.05 level of 
significance 
 
The number of respondents answering each direct choice question ranged from 101 to 179 with 
the number greater in the odd versions using an iterative procedure (groups 1 and 3).  The 
combination of the inconsistent responses in the non- iterative procedures and valuing at least 
one of the health states as worse than dead resulted in fewer respondents in the even non 
iterative versions of TTO (groups 6 and 8) being presented with the direct choice question. It is 
immediately obvious that many of the splits are a long way indeed from 50:50, with the most 
extreme split for 12212/13122 pairing being 80:20 in Group 3. The standard DCE approach 
would then assume that difference in utility between two lives was very large indeed-yet they 
have been set here to be equivalent since duration was chosen in order to produce two health 
profile with the same utility.  
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Tables 3 and 4 also show the results of the one- sample binomial tests of whether the probability 
of choosing Life A was significantly different than 0.5.   It can be seen that, in the case of the 
traditional TTO, the null hypothesis (that p = 0.5) is rejected in the case of 4 and 3 of the 6 
choices in Groups 1 and 2 respectively.  In the case of the odd groups, none of the other variants 
resulted in the null hypothesis being accepted more often than in the traditional TTO.  In the 
case of the even groups, the null hypothesis was accepted in 5 of the 6 choices, indicating that 
there may have been some slight tendency there to bring the TTO and choice closer, although 
caution has to be applied due to the smaller numbers of respondents in that group.  A general 
trend shown in Table 4 is that the splits in the last 3 columns involving the more severe states 
are closer to 50:50.  We return to this issue in the discussion. 
 
It is obvious that the general tendency is to favour Life A that involves the first of the two health 
states reported in each pair and which more respondents valued higher than the other in TTO-
than vice versa. We return to this issue below. In order to explore further the overall pattern 
across TTO variants, we combined the data across the 6 choices and used a GEE model to 
explore the extent to which choices differed significantly by the TTO method used to elicit the 
responses.  In the GEE model the dependent variable was the probability of choosing Life B 
and the constant term estimated the impact on choice for the ‘traditional TTO’ in the odd group.  
As the constant terms shows a strong pattern to choose Life A that resulted in the move away 
from 50:50 in the splits, a positive coefficient on the other variables here is indicating that 
choices are closer to a 50:50 split than in the case of traditional TTO.  Dummy variables and 
interaction effects were included to investigate whether the modelled effects were less 
pronounced in certain variants.  For example, were the choices of respondents who had 
completed the ‘traditional TTO’ in the Even group (on the more severe states) significantly 
different than the choices of those who had completed the ‘traditional TTO’ in the Odd group 
(on the less severe states)?  This comparison is captured by the dummy term ‘even group =1’.   
Were the choices of those completing the ‘non-iterative sequential’ TTO on the odd states 
different than the choices of those completing the ‘traditional TTO’ on those same states? This 
comparison is captured by the ‘non-iterative: sequential’ dummy. Interaction terms were also 
included to investigate whether the impact of TTO variant differed across the Odd and Even 
groups.    
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Table 5: The GEE model with ‘Prob of choosing Life B’ as dependent variable. 
TTO Group 
 
Coef. 
 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Constant -0.6939 0.0855 -8.12 0.000 -0.8614 to -0.5264 
Dummies      
Even Group (=1) 0.3075 0.1211 2.54 0.011 0.0701 to 0.5445 
Iterative: concurrent  -0.1001 0.1208 -0.83 0.407 -0.3366 to 0.1365 
Non-iterative: sequential -0.0984 0.1245 0.79 0.429 -0.1457 to 0.3425 
Non-iterative: concurrent  -0.0670 0.1266 -0.53 0.597 -0.3152 to  0.1812 
Interactions      
Iterative:concurrent & Even -0.0657 0.1749 -0.38 0.707 -0.4085 to 0.2770 
Non-iterative:sequential & Even 0.0616 0.1777 0.35 0.729 -0.2867 to 0.4099 
Non-iterative: concurrent & Even 0.1332 0.1832 0.73 0.467 -0.2259 to 0.4923 
Wald chi2(5)       =     140.96                              Scale parameter:  1      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
*Based on 9677 observations.   
 
Table 5 shows the significant and positive coefficient on the ‘Even’ group dummy indicates a 
higher probability of choosing Life B in those groups- which results in choices that are closer 
to 50:50 than in the odd groups (given that the move away from 50:50 is in the direction of a 
preference for Life A).   
 
We return to the issue of the general preference for Life A in the choices as it is worth looking 
at this in more detail. Recall that the health states that appeared under lives A and B were set in 
advance by the researchers.  Thus, depending on the respondent’s TTO valuations, either Life 
A or Life B could involve fewer years in the ‘better’ health state or vice versa. In order to 
explore the pattern of choices in terms of whether the respondent was selecting the Life 
involving fewer years in a better state-or vice versa- Tables 6 and 7 shows the relationship 
between direct choice and the respondent’s own TTO values according to whether, U1>U2, 
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U1=U2 or U1<U2 in each pair. When U1> U2, Life A would then involve the shorter time in 
the better (for that respondent) health state. When U1=U2, Lives A and B would involve the 
same number of life years and when U1 < U2, Life A would involve the longer time in the 
worse (for that respondent) health state. Tables 6 and 7 shows in brackets the number of 
respondents with each TTO pattern and the percentage of those respondents that went onto 
choose Life A in direct choices.  So, for example, for the 11121 vs 21211 comparison in Group1, 
60 respondents valued 11121 more highly than 21211 in TTO and 47% of those went onto 
choose Life A involving fewer years in state 11121. Seventy six respondents valued 11121 
equal to 21211 and 76% of those went onto choose Life A in direct choice- in this case involving 
the same number of years life in 11121 and 21211.   
 
We begin by looking at the cases of dominance where clear predictions may be made (11121 
dominates 13122 in the odd groups and 13122 dominates 13224 and 23242 in the even groups). 
Where one state dominates another, but receives the same valuation in TTO, we would expect 
respondents to overwhelmingly choose the dominant state in a straight choice involving the 
same number of life years and our data confirms this finding. 
 
What is more interesting, however, is that even when no dominance exists and U1=U2 in the 
TTO, there is often a strong preference for Life A involving the first health state in the pair.  
This cannot be explained by a preference for a shorter time in a better health state- or vice versa- 
as the life years in the direct choices are then equivalent. What we have uncovered appears to 
be a strong preference for the life involving the first state in the pair- which the majority of 
respondents who had made a distinction in TTO had valued more highly than the other. This 
suggests that at least a number of respondents did agree with the aggregate ranking of the health 
states, but that was not reflected in their TTO responses. We return to this issue in the 
discussion. 
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Table 6: The percentage of respondents choosing ‘Life A’ involving the first state in each pair 
broken down by respondents own TTO responses (numbers in each category)-Odd groups 
 
  Pairs of health states involved in the direct choices 
 
TTO method TTO 
values* 
11121 
vs 
21211 
11121 
vs 
12212 
11121 
vs 
13122 
21211 
vs 
12212 
21211 
vs 
13122 
12212 
vs 
13122 
Group 1 
 
Iterative: 
sequential 
(traditional 
TTO) 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
47% (60) 
 
76% (76) 
 
89% (36) 
40% (93) 
 
68% (53) 
 
76%  (21) 
66%(104) 
 
91% (45) 
 
81% (16) 
39% (88) 
 
60% (53) 
 
79% (24) 
62% (96) 
 
87% (46) 
 
72% (23) 
64% (73) 
  
95% (37) 
 
89% (52) 
Group3 
 
Iterative: 
concurrent 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
39% (83) 
 
80% (64) 
 
91% (32) 
49% (112) 
 
87% (53) 
 
100% (12) 
62%(120) 
 
97% (34) 
 
100%(16) 
 
41% (93) 
 
83% (46) 
 
89% (36) 
64% (108) 
 
88% (40) 
 
95% (21) 
65% (80) 
 
88% (42) 
 
98% (46) 
Group 5 
Non-iterative: 
sequential 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
42% (62) 
 
80% (64) 
 
79% (14) 
52% (90) 
 
48% (44) 
 
100% (12) 
63%(104) 
 
96% (27) 
 
67% (3) 
34% (67)  
 
60% (52) 
 
88% (24) 
60% (98) 
 
83% (42) 
 
73% (11) 
66% (67) 
 
94% (47) 
 
90% (19) 
Group 7 
Non-iterative: 
concurrent 
 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
59% (93) 
 
71% (80) 
 
88% (17) 
54% (68) 
 
66% (53) 
 
82% (17) 
69% (94) 
 
93% (41) 
 
100% (3) 
41% (68) 
 
 54% (61) 
  
90%(19) 
66% (90) 
  
84% (50) 
 
80% (5) 
68% (72) 
 
88% (49) 
 
79% (14) 
*where U1 refers to the respondent’s own TTO valuation for the first health state in each pair 
and U2 to the respondent’s own TTO valuation for the second health state in the pair.    
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Table 7: The percentage of respondents choosing ‘Life A’ involving the first state in the pair 
broken down by respondents own TTO responses (numbers in each category)-Even groups 
  Pairs of health states involved in the direct choices 
TTO method TTO 
values * 
13122 
vs 
13224 
13122 
vs 
23242 
13122 
vs 
23314 
13224 
vs 
23242 
13224 
vs 
23314 
23314 
vs 
23242 
Group 2 
 
Iterative: 
sequential 
(traditional 
TTO) 
 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
59% (112) 
 
70% (20) 
 
85% (20) 
66% (128) 
 
78% (18) 
 
75% (12) 
34%(106) 
 
72% (25) 
 
81% (21) 
56% (70) 
 
52% (25) 
 
72% (50) 
41% (59) 
 
49% (49) 
 
72% (43) 
45% (67) 
 
62% (24) 
 
70% (53) 
Group 4 
 
Iterative: 
concurrent 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
57% (105) 
 
69% (13) 
 
96% (23) 
59% (106) 
 
91% (11) 
 
87% (15) 
38% (98) 
 
81% (16) 
 
91% (21) 
46% (66) 
 
73% (22) 
 
69% (35) 
51% (49) 
 
73% (37) 
 
98% (44) 
40% (58) 
 
42% (26) 
 
66% (34) 
Group 6 
Non-iterative: 
sequential 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
57% (93) 
 
85% (20) 
 
86% (7) 
58% (107) 
 
67% (12) 
 
100% (7) 
59% (95) 
 
80% (15) 
 
100% (8) 
46% (59) 
 
52% (25) 
 
54% (37) 
26% (51) 
 
48% (50) 
 
73% (30) 
37% (48) 
 
61% (26) 
 
63% (38) 
Group 8 
Non-iterative: 
concurrent 
 
 
U1> U2 
 
U1 = U2 
 
U1 < U2 
55% (85) 
 
86% (14) 
 
86% (7) 
56% (86) 
 
80% (15) 
 
67% (3) 
67% (81) 
 
76% (21) 
 
100% (5) 
40% (48) 
 
63% (27) 
 
75% (32) 
22% (23) 
 
59% (54) 
 
71% (35) 
48% (52) 
 
59% (22) 
 
78% (27) 
*where U1 refers to the respondent’s own TTO valuation for the first health state in each pair 
and U2 to the respondent’s own TTO valuation for the second health state in the pair.    
 
DISCUSSION 
We systematically varied aspects of TTO in order to bring TTO more in line with how choices 
would be presented in a DCE that set out to derive utility values using time as the numeraire-
sometimes referred to as DCETTO.  We found that TTO responses were not robust to the 
procedural variations tested here, which is similar to previous studies that have found that 
different procedures yield different results13,14.  For example, it has previously been shown that 
the elicitation procedures used15, whether ‘props’ are used or not16 and the mode of 
administration of the survey17 can all affect the values derived. We then tested whether it was 
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possible to use the TTO valuations to predict direct choices between health states. The direct 
choices were set up such that any individual respondent ought to be indifferent between the 
lives on offer in the direct choice and, hence, there would be a 50:50 split in aggregate. We 
found that a number of the splits were a long way indeed from 50:50, but that the divergence 
between TTO and direct choice did not disappear when alternative TTO variants were deployed. 
The divergence from 50:50 was not, however, random but systematically favoured Life A 
which always involved the state that the majority of respondents (who had made a distinction) 
in the TTO had valued more highly. Those respondents who valued two states equally in the 
TTO (and, hence, were presented with direct choices involving the same number of life years) 
overwhelmingly went for the life involving the state that the majority had rated as better.  This 
effect was more marked in the odd groups involving the less severe states.   
 
Some of the results do appear relatively easy to explain. Respondents who valued two states 
equally in the TTO and, hence, were faced with the same number of life years in the direct 
choice, often had a strong aggregate preference for one state over the other.  Based on how DCE 
responses are analysed, the utility values of those states would be assumed to be very far apart- 
and yet they were valued equally in the TTO.  At least some of this anomaly may be explained 
by the fact that respondents who did not trade life years in the TTO were presented with the 
same durations in the direct choice. Even a slight preference for one health state over the other 
would then lead them to choose the life involving that state without having to sacrifice any life 
expectancy. Whilst there is no a priori reason to suppose, for example, that 11121 is better than 
21211 for any particular respondent, it appears that many who did value the states equally in 
TTO did consider 11121 to be better than 21211 and that preference came out in the direct 
choice.  But only around half of respondents who valued 11121 equal to 21211 in the TTO were 
non traders on both states, so non-trading alone cannot explain the pattern fully.  
 
In setting up the choices we did not assume the linear QALY model to hold as we believed that 
to be too restrictive. Whilst our approach did allow for more flexibility than under the linear 
QALY model which is often deployed elsewhere, it could be argued that even the assumptions 
of MUI and CPTO are strong ones.  Whilst space did not permit a detailed discussion of the 
method here, we did run a parallel study in which the direct choices were set up in such a way 
that relied only on transitivity. The data showed that failures of the assumptions of MUI and 
CPTO were not the main drivers of the results reported here.  Details of the parallel study are 
available from the authors on request.  
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We do, however, believe there may be an explanation of our findings in terms of the differential 
error structure of TTO and choice. Suppose that in TTO subjects maximize utility functions 
U(11121)=V(11121)+error and U(21211)=V(21211)+error and V(11121) > V(21211), where 
U(.) is the utility used by the respondent in the TTO questions and V(.) is the ‘true’ utility value 
for this subject.  Overall, the majority of cases will state U(11121)>U(21211) when 
V(11121)>V(21211).  But there will be some respondents, for whom V(11121)>V(21211) and 
yet who stated U(11121)<U(21211) due to the  overlapping nature of utility distributions. 
However, in a direct choice it can be easier for these people to observe that (11121) is milder 
than (21211) as only ordinal preferences are required.  
 
Of course, the choice results may be driven not only by differences in intrinsic utility but also 
by how easy it is for respondents to see that one state is better than another, termed 
‘comparability’18.  Likewise, Tversky19 noted that “choice probabilities, therefore, reflect not 
only the utilities of the alternatives in question, but also the difficulty of comparing them”  (p. 
284) and for this reason “the probability of selecting an alternative depends not only on its 
overall value, but also on its relations to the other available alternatives” (p. 295). This led him 
to question the assumption that choices can be represented by independent random variables, 
that is, by an independent random utility model. Our results raise the possibility that something 
like this that may be happening in choices between health profiles. One possible explanation of 
the finding that the splits were closer to 50:50 for the more severe states is that they are more 
difficult to compare in that more levels and dimensions are changing at one time. Further 
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of the current paper, but it raises important 
questions about the fundamental assumptions underpinning most DCE models if it is true that 
choices may be driven not only by differences in utilities but also by how easy it is to compare 
alternatives. This would generate changes in the error structure of the model used to link choices 
and utility. 
 
A limitation of the study is that health states were not randomised to Life A and Life B in the 
direct choice, and the strong preference for Life A could, of course, indicate a tendency to 
favour the left hand option.  This explanation cannot, however, account for all the findings as 
it cannot explain the different patterns observed between Odd and Even groups.  
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It then seems likely that the disparity between TTO and direct choice that we find in our paper 
is being driven by a combination of factors, certain to do with ‘problems’ with TTO that are 
already well known about (such as insensitivity and non-trading for mild health states) whilst 
others are to do with the appropriate interpretation of choice data which has been rather less 
explored to date. It would appear though that the combination of these factors are more 
important drivers of the disparity between TTO and choice than the procedural issues we set 
out to look at here. We recommend that future research address the issue of choices being 
driven by factors other than differences in utilities and for this to be explored in a systematic 
way.  
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Appendix 1:   The assumptions used in setting up the direct choices.  
We illustrate the conceptual framework with some simple notation.  Suppose that in the TTO 
method each alternative is characterized by a pair (q,t) where q is quality of life and t is time.  
Consider now the quality of life of health state i, denoted by 𝑞𝑖, and for simplicity let us assume 
that this health state is strictly worse than normal health. In order to establish indifference in 
the TTO, subjects have to undertake a sequence of binary choices (𝑞𝑁𝐻, 𝑡𝑁𝐻
∗ ) vs (𝑞𝑖, 𝑡𝑖 ) to 
determine in which interval the value of health state i lies, where normal health is 𝑞𝑁𝐻. In the 
conventional TTO, 𝑡𝑖  is kept constant and 𝑡𝑁𝐻
∗ is adjusted until indifference is reached (where 
the asterisk is used to denote the variable that is adjusted to reach indifference).  Assume that 
at indifference the subject sets  (𝑞𝑁𝐻, 𝑡𝑁𝐻
∗ )~(𝑞𝑖, 𝑡𝑖 ) where 𝑡𝑖 ≻𝑡𝑁𝐻
∗  since 𝑞𝑖 ≺𝑞𝑁𝐻.  
 
Consider now two such TTO questions, that are used to value health states 1 and 2 respectively 
(i.e. i=1, 2) and 𝑡𝑖  is kept constant (i.e. 𝑡𝑖 = 𝑡).  We have then that (𝑞𝑁𝐻, 𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 )~(𝑞1, 𝑡) and 
(𝑞𝑁𝐻, 𝑡𝑁𝐻
2 )~(𝑞2, 𝑡) where and 𝑡𝑁𝐻
1  and 𝑡𝑁𝐻
2  are the durations that make the subject indifferent 
between for health states 1 and 2 respectively.  The study then uses these two TTO judgments 
to present a choice comparing health state 1 and 2 directly.  So for example, respondents are 
asked to compare 𝑡1  in health state 1 and 𝑡2  in health state 2.  In the tests set out in this paper 
(𝑡1 , 𝑡2 ) are set so that the respondent should be indifferent between the two alternatives, i.e. 
(𝑞1, 𝑡1 )~(𝑞2, 𝑡2 ) as explained in more detail below. 
 
If mutual utility dependence holds, and the utility function is multiplicative then  
(𝑞𝑁𝐻, 𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 )~(𝑞1, 𝑡) and (𝑞𝑁𝐻, 𝑡𝑁𝐻
2 )~(𝑞2, 𝑡) should imply that U(𝑞𝑁𝐻) x U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 )=U(𝑞1) x U(𝑡) 
and U(𝑞𝑁𝐻) x U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
2 )=U(𝑞2) x U(𝑡) and then: 
 
 
U(𝑞𝑁𝐻) x U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 )
U(𝑞𝑁𝐻) x U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
2 )
=
U(𝑞1) x U(𝑡)
U(𝑞2) x U(𝑡)
    (1) 
 
And with the cancellation of common terms this expression simplifies to: 
 
U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 )
U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
2 )
=
U(𝑞1) 
U(𝑞2) 
    (2) 
 
Let us now choose any durations 𝑡1  and 𝑡2  such that: 
 
𝑡1
𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 =
𝑡2
𝑡𝑁𝐻
2 = 𝑘  (3) 
 
Rearranging question (3) gives 𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 =
𝑡1
𝑘
 and 𝑡𝑁𝐻
2 =
𝑡2
𝑘
 which we substitute into equation (2). 
 
Constant proportional trade off (CPTO) assumes that the respondent will always trade off the 
same proportion of life years in the TTO. Under CPTO the utility function for life years, U(t), 
is homogeneous, which implies that U(K t) = K x U(t) where K is any constant term and t is 
time.  So under CPTO U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 ) =
U(𝑡𝑁𝐻
1 )
𝑘
 .  As this also holds for health state 2, then, we have 
with the cancellation of common terms that,  
 
 28 
 U(𝑡1 )
U(𝑡2 )
=
U(𝑞1)
U(𝑞2)
  →  𝑈(𝑡1 , 𝑞2) = 𝑈(𝑡2 , 𝑞1) 
 
So, from two TTO questions, we can select pairs (𝑡1 , 𝑡2 ) such that we can generate choices 
between two health profiles of the same utility. At the aggregate level, we would expect half of 
the respondents choosing one option and half choosing the other option in a forced binary 
choice task. This is the main test we will conduct in this paper. 
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Appendix 2: Sections 1-3 of the survey 
 
In section 1, respondents first saw a general introduction;  
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey. The purpose of the survey is to try and find 
out what matters to members of the public- like yourself- when it comes to thinking about health 
improvements. But, as you will be aware, there are thousands of different types of treatments 
that could be funded on the NHS and we cannot ask about them all. What we are going to do 
here instead is to ask about what matters in general to people in terms of health improvements. 
For example, some treatments improve quality of life, others prolong life expectancy, whilst 
others improve both the quality and length of life. This survey is going to ask you a number of 
questions designed to find out about the relative importance you place on different types of 
health improvements. There are no right or wrong answers- we just want to know what you 
personally think.  
 
Respondents were then presented with 3 statements in turn and asked to indicate the strength 
of their agreement on a 5 point Likert scale running from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree 
(5):  
1. I would always prefer to live as long as possible regardless of what my quality of life 
was. 
2. I would always prefer to have a good quality of life than to live for a long time in a poor 
health state.  
3. I would rather be dead than live in a really bad health state in which my quality of life 
was very low. 
 
The purpose of this task was to get respondents thinking in general terms about quality and 
length of life before they were faced with the TTO questions. Respondents were then introduced 
to the EQ 5D (5L) descriptive system and asked, in turn, which of the 5 dimensions were the 
most and least important to them personally (ties were allowed). They were then asked to 
identify their own health state on the EQ 5D (5L) descriptive system.   
 
In section 2 respondents were first asked to think about how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ it would be to be 
in a particular health state and were introduced, in turn, to EQ 5D (5L) states 11111 (hereafter 
labelled ‘normal health’), 12111, 23322 and 43545.  The last 3 health states would not feature 
in the TTO exercises to follow, but were included here in order to provide a common ‘frame’ 
to all respondents.  In particular, state 43545 was more severe than any that would feature in 
the exercises to follow, but we were keen to introduce all respondents to wide range of EQ 5D 
states. 
 
In section 3 respondents were introduced to the general idea behind TTO exercises. 
Respondents were first asked to consider being in state 23322 for 20 years after which time 
they would die- denoted by ‘Life A’ They were asked to think about being in the ‘good health’ 
state for 20 years – denoted by ‘Life B’.  They were told that ‘in this case Life B is clearly better 
than Life A’ and were then asked ‘but what if life B was fewer than 20 years- what if life B was 
13 years?’  They were then asked just to think about which of the two lives they would prefer - 
but without having to record a response. They were then told that ‘in the screens that follow’, 
they would be choosing between a different Lives A and B each time. 
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Appendix 3: Achieved sample  
 Sample UK  Sample UK 
Male 18-25 3.7% 6.4% Female 18-25 5.0% 6.4% 
Male 26-35 10.3% 8.8% Female 26-35 12.3% 9.6% 
Male 36-45 9.1% 9.6% Female 36-45 10.0% 9.6% 
Male 46-54 11.2% 7.2% Female 46-54 13.0% 8.0% 
Male 55-64 7.4% 6.4% Female 55-64 8.8% 7.2% 
Male 65+ 5.1% 8.8% Female 65+ 4.1% 12.0% 
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Appendix 4: Linear regression of impact of TTO variant on TTO valuations. 
 
Variable coefficient 
Standard 
error 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
 
constant 0.6839 0.0164 * 0.6669 0.0232 * 
State11121 0.1409 0.0179 * 0.1463 0.0187 * 
State21211 0.1151 0.0179 * 0.1205 0.0187 * 
State12212 -0.0192 0.1797  -0.0138 0.0188  
State13224 -0.2171 0.0179 * -0.2225 0.0187 * 
State23242 -0.2739 0.0179 * -0.2793 0.0187 * 
State23314 -0.2290 0.0179 * -0.2344 0.0187 * 
Methodic -0.0536 0.0230 * -0.0393 0.0326  
Methodnis 0.0048 0.0237  -0.0051 0.0333  
Methodnic -0.0301 0.0241  -0.0238 0.0336  
ic_11121 0.0334 0.0252  0.0288 0.0264  
ic_21211 0.0182 0.0253  0.0136 0.0264  
ic_12212 0.0515 0.0253 * 0.0469 0.0265  
ic_13224 -0.0226 0.0252  -0.0179 0.0263  
ic_23242 -0.0437 0.0253  -0.0390 0.0264  
ic_23314 -0.0264 0.0253  -0.0218 0.0264  
nis_11121 0.0473 0.0265  0.0511 0.0276  
nis_21211 0.0233 0.0260  0.0270 0.0271  
nis_12212 0.0650 0.0264 * 0.0689 0.0276 * 
nis_13224 -0.0517 0.0263 * -0.0567 0.0276 * 
nis_23242 -0.0555 0.0265 * -0.0601 0.0277 * 
nis_23314 -0.0626 0.0265 * -0.0674 0.0278 * 
nic_11121 0.0185 0.0267  0.0166 0.0278  
nic_21211 0.0231 0.0264  0.0212 0.0273  
nic_12212 0.0959 0.0265 * 0.0941 0.0276 * 
nic_13224 -0.0360 0.0267  -0.0347 0.0281  
nic_23242 -0.0186 0.0269  -0.0172 0.0282  
nic_23314 -0.0145 0.0268  -0.0132 0.0282  
GROUP_EVEN    0.0330 0.0328  
ic_EVEN    -0.0286 0.0460  
nis_EVEN    0.0210 0.0473  
nic_EVEN    -0.0116 0.0481  
Overall r- 
squared 
0.2500 
 
 
0.2242 
  
 
*statistically significant at a 0.05 level 
We show two regressions: the first looks at the impact of variants upon the TTO values and 
the second additionally investigates whether the value of 13122 (the common health state 
which everyone valued, and which is the intercept term in the regression) was significantly 
different between the odd and even groups.  
 
Definition of variables that appear in the model reported in Appendix 4. 
 
constant = value of health state 13122 under the traditional TTO variant. For the regression that 
excludes dummies for odd and even groups, the constant represents the value of health state 13122 
averaged across odd and even groups. In the fifth and sixth column of the table the constant is the 
value of health state 13122 under the traditional TTO variant for the odd group.  
 
State11121, State21211, State12212, State13224, State23242 and State23314 are dummies for the 
additional impact on utilities (compared to 13122) of the associated EQ 5D state. 
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methodic is the impact of the iterative concurrent variant upon the utility value of state 13122 
methodnis is the impact of non-iterative sequential variant upon the utility value of state 13122 
methodnic is the impact of non-iterative concurrent variant upon the utility value of state13122 
 
The interaction terms look at whether the variants affected the valuations of the other health states, e.g. 
ic_11121  looks at the impact of the iterative concurrent variant on state 11121. 
nis_11121 looks at the impact of the non-iterative sequential variant on state 11121. 
nic_11121 looks at the impact of the non-iterative concurrent variant on state 11121. 
Likewise, for the remaining health states.   
 
GROUP_EVEN is whether state 13122 was valued differently in the even groups than the odd groups 
in the traditional TTO. 
 
Further interaction terms e.g. ic_EVEN look at whether health state 13122 was valued differently for 
the method iterative concurrent in the Even groups. Similar dummies are defined for the other 
variants. 
 
 
